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CASENOTES
IN RE CUSTODY OF
CHRISTY ELIZABETH TOWNSEND*
APPLYING THE "BEST INTERESTS"
DOCTRINE TO CUSTODY DISPUTES

BETWEEN A BIOLOGICAL PARENT AND A
THIRD PARTY
I honestly believe that if I had to deal with these kinds of factors and this kind of evidence on a day to day basis I don't think I
could survive it. This has been, in my opinion, the worse [sic I case
involving custody of a three year old child that I have ever had to
deal with and I hope I never have to deal with another.
Honorable John L. Davis**
Invoking the story of Solomon' and his famous test,
designed to separate the selfish concerns of contending women
from the selfless ones and award custody on that basis, is a time
honored custom in the field of child custody. It is one which is
cherished by judges and authors 2 as a model of judicial wisdom
* 90 Ill.
App. 3d 292, 413 N.E.2d 428 (1980). This case was subsequently
reversed and remanded by the Illinois Supreme Court, Nos. 54282, 54365
Cons. (Ill.
Sup. Ct. Sept. 1981). See Epilogue, infra.
** Record, In re Custody of Christy Elizabeth Townsend, No. 79-F-149
(Cir. Ct. Macon County 1980).
1. A child custody dispute demonstrated Solomon's legendary wisdom:
Then the King said, "The one says, 'This is my son that is alive, and
your son is dead'; the other says, 'No; but your son is dead, and my son
is the living one.'" And the King said, "Bring me a sword." So a sword
was brought before the King. And the King said, "Divide the living
child in two, and give half to the one, and half to the other." Then the
woman whose son was alive said to the King, because her heart
yearned for her son, "Oh, my lord, give her the living child, and by no
means slay it." But the other said, "It shall be neither mine nor yours;
divide it." Then the King answered and said, "Give the living child to
the first woman, and by no means slay it; she is its mother." And all
Israel heard of the judgment which the King had rendered; and they
stood in awe of the King, because they perceived that the wisdom of
God was in him, to render justice.
1 Kings 3:23 (Revised Standard Version).
2. In re Custody of Christy Elizabeth Townsend, 90 III. App. 3d at 293,
413 N.E.2d at 423. See Schiller, Child Custody: Evolution of Current Criteria, 26 DE PAUL L. REV. 241 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Schiller]; Comment,
PsychologicalParentsvs. Biological Parents: The Courts' Response to New
Directions in Child Custody Dispute Resolution, 17 J. FAM. L 577 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as New Directions]; Comment, Best Interests of the ChildMaryland Child Custody Disputes, 37 MD.L. REv. 641 (1978).
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in determining what is best for the child. While not always epitomizing Solomon's wisdom, contemporary American law comes
closer to demonstrating this concern than did our ancient English forebears and tribes who similarly inhabited the ancient
world. 3 English law maintained a completely hands off policy
regarding the parent-child relationship until the seventeenth
century. 4 Even then, while infanticide was forbidden, it persisted and went virtually unpunished through the nineteenth
century.5 As long as a child was not a public burden,6 society
ignored, or at best, refused to inject itself into the child rearing
3. McGough & Shindell, Coming of Age: The Best Interest of the Child
Standardin ParentThird Party Custody Disputes, 27 EMORY L.J. 209 (1978)

[hereinafter cited as McGough & Shindell]. Parents belonging to tribes
such as the Anglos, Saxons and Gauls practiced infanticide until the Norman Conquest in 1066. See G. WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE
CRIMINAL LAw 13-14 (1957). Infanticide for many of these ancient peoples
had several advantages in controlling population. Unlike abortion and
primitive contraception, the mother's life was not threatened. Further from
a prudential standpoint, a parent would be unable to provide for the family
already in existence if he were unable to control his family's expansion.
Ethical considerations aside, it was possible to rationalize that the newborn
was not a full human being as no ritualistic ceremony marking the event
had yet occurred. See 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MArrLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLUSH LAw 436-37 (2d ed. 1898). Throughout the seventh century and until
1066 the church sanctioned selling children under the age of seven into slavery if it was necessary.
4. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1269 (4th ed. 1968) defines parenspatriae
as "Father ... parent of the country. In England, the King. In the United
States, the state, as a sovereign-referring to the sovereign power of guardianship over persons under disability... such as minors, and insane and
incompetent persons." The English Crown first articulated this concept
during the seventeenth century. The theory espoused by the crown, while
recognizing the natural right of the parents to the custody of their child,
also recognized the reciprocal duty and obligation the child and the state
owed to each other. The child from birth owed allegiance to the state. Likewise, the state in turn was obliged to regulate child custody whenever it
became necessary to protect the welfare of the child. See Comment, Child
Custody: Best Interests of Children vs. ConstitutionalRights of Parents,81
DICK.

L. REv. 733, 734 n.2 (1977). Eventually the Court of Chancery asserted

its jurisdiction over these matters. See Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine
of ParensPatriae,27 EMORY L.J. 401 (1978); Parker, Some HistoricalObservations on the Juvenile Court, 9 CRnI. L.Q. 478 (1967) [hereinafter cited as

Parker]. In the United States the "spirit of parens patriae has been
achieved in the establishment of probation, foster homes and institutions
for juveniles." Id.
5. R. HELFER & C. KEMPE, THE BATTERED CHIL 8 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as HELFER]. Greed was the cause of death for eighty per cent of the
illegitimate children of the nineteenth century who were murdered after
being put out to nurse. After the fee was paid, cold-blooded wet nurses
quickly did away with their charges. Greedy midwives who arranged for
the infant's death profited after the child was buried through the insurance
system or so called burial clubs.
6. HELFER, supra note 5, at 11. While the pauper apprentice system
was put to rest by a parliamentary act in 1802, traditional parental rights
over their children remained intact. This humane act did not apply to children under their parent's supervision. These children worked unconsciona-
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process, 7 deeming it as strictly within the domain of the parent.
American law was also tardy in identifying the interests of
children and protecting them from parental abuse and neglect
until nearly the twentieth century. At this time, reform movements headed by religious and voluntary organizations convinced state legislatures to recognize the need for establishing
separate courts for juveniles. 8 At the same time, state legislatures began drafting criminal statutes proscribing child abuse.9
These cruelty to children statutes were precipitated by the Mary
Ellen child abuse case decided in 1874 by the New York
Supreme Court.'0 Although there were statutes protecting animals, which the court could rely on to determine parental culpability, child abuse statutes were nonexistent. Ironically, the
animal cruelty statutes were instrumental in the conviction of
Mary Ellen's stepmother, thus clearly demonstrating the need
for legislation protecting children."
Today, while courts and legislatures working hand-in-hand
are quick to remove a child from an abusive and detrimental livbly long hours and were often grossly maltreated. The Industrial Age
exacted a heavy toll from these infant laborers.
7. But see 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 451 (1969). Poor parents
incapable of supporting their offspring were directed to apprentice or indenture their children once past "the age of nurture." The rich could raise their
children as they pleased. They could "breed up their children to be ornaments or disgraces to their family." Id. 426, n.5. See also J. EHRLICH, EHRLICH's BLACKSTONE 87, 89 (1959). While a parent had the duty to maintain,

protect and educate his children, he was not obliged to provide such maintenance unless the children were incapable of working either through illness, accident, or infancy. Even then he was only obliged to provide the
necessaries.
8. In 1899, Illinois became the first jurisdiction to establish a juvenile
court. Laws of Illinois, 1899, p. 131. See Parker, supra note 4, at 480; See also
S. NAGI, CHILD MALTREATMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 1

(1977).

9. See McGough &Shindell, supra note 3, at 210; see generally Paulsen,
The Legal Frameworkfor Child Protection 66 COLUM. L. REV. 681 (1966); see
also TALAN, DEFRANK, & GAMM, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT LEGAL HANDBOOK (1978) [hereinafter cited as TALAN].
10. TALAN, supra note 9, at 3. Mary Ellen, a nine year old was found
chained to a bed in her parents' apartment severely bruised and suffering
from malnutrition. She was discovered accidentally by a church worker,
who having no alternative, appealed to the ASPCA. Together they were
able to remove her from this life threatening environment but only under

laws preventing cruelty to animals on the ground that she was a member of

the animal kingdom in need of protection. HELFER, supra note 5, at 13. See
McGough & Shindell, supra note 3, at 210 n.7.
11. Id. As a result of the Mary Ellen case New York City founded the
Society for the Prevention to Cruelty to Children. See N. EBELING & D.
HILL, CHILD ABUSE: INTERVENTION AND TREATMENT 8 (1975). The Massachusetts Society was the second such organization founded in 1878. Great Britain followed by passing an act preventing cruelty to children.
Unfortunately it was not until 1964 that Massachusetts specifically described the kinds of protection children could be expected to receive from
abuse.
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ing environment, and have worked similarly to decide the custody of a child whose parents have severed matrimonial ties,
they have shown great reluctance and trepidation where parent
13
and nonparent-third party 12 custody disputes are concerned.
Traditionally, these disputes posed no problem for the court. If
the parent was fit,1 4 he had a natural or an inherent right to his
child.'5 This philosophy, commonly referred to as the parental
rights doctrine, mandates that a biological parent is entitled to
custody of the child unless the parent is affirmatively shown to
be unfit. This doctrine focuses on the natural parent and his
rights and feelings: minimal consideration is given to the child's
rights and feelings. 16
12. A parent is one who generates a child. It generally refers to the father and mother by blood or one who has acquired legal custody through
adoption or otherwise. In custody disputes a third party is one who may be
related by blood or marriage but more distantly than that of the natural
parent. He or she is often a grandparent, step-parent, brother, sister, aunt
or uncle. However, he or she need not be related in any way to the child
except by psychological or emotional bonds.
13. The Illinois legislature like other state legislatures, borrowed their
custody standard from the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 402. In Illinois the standard can be found under the Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act § 602. Apparently little thought was given to a third party seeking
custody, as all relevant factors to be considered under the standard, and the
language of the standard itself, applies to custody disputes between natural
parents after the breakdown of their marriage as the Act's title indicates.
Legislative indirection in third party disputes may be responsible for the
confusion and uncertainty exhibited by courts in third party disputes, resulting in the absence of uniform application.
14. Illinois requires clear and convincing evidence of unfitness to terminate parental rights. In re Nitz, 76 Ill. App. 3d 15, 394 N.E.2d 887 (1979). Mrs.
Nitz was found to be indifferent to her child's severe health problems and
an examination of the child showed that his nutrition was deficient. There
were rats in the hallway of the building and unsanitary conditions existed
in the Nitz apartment. The child, on one occasion, was observed drinking
curdled milk. Dog feces and urine stains were evident throughout the
apartment. There was no evidence that Mrs. Nitz made any commitment to
improve this environment. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 705-2, 705-7 (1979);
New Directions,supra note 2, at 545; See also Simpson, The Unfit Parent, 39
U. DET. L.J. 347 (1962).
15. In re Weinstein, 68 Ill. App. 3d 883, 386 N.E.2d 593 (1979); In re Sparrow, 59 Ill. App. 3d 731, 376 N.E.2d 236 (1978). Parental rights are parents'
inherent right to the custody of their children. See also Behn v. Timmons,
345 So. 2d 388, 389 (Fla. 1977); State ex rel. Sparks v. Reeves, 97 So. 2d 18
(Fla. 1957). A basic proposition is that parents have a natural God-given
right to enjoy the custody and the companionship of their offspring. This
rule is older than the common law and traces its roots to Genesis 4:1. 2 J.
EQurrY JURISPRUDENCE 589 (1877) [hereinafter
cited as STORY] (the father's common law custodial rights could only be
terminated for gross misconduct on his part by the chancery court).
16. See note 14 supra. See, e.g., Cormack v. Marshall, 211 Il. 519, 71 N.E.
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON

1077 (1904) (court ignored the child's emotional attachment to his grandfather and failed to discuss whether the child even knew his father).
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Growing concern for the welfare of the child in custody situations, due to a burgeoning fascination with psychological studies and the disappearance of the child as personal property
concept, 17 has led to a gradual change in judicial attitude. This
change in attitude has given rise to the best interests of the child
doctrine. 18 This doctrine is presently applied in the vast majority of jurisdictions in custody disputes between parents, although few jurisdictions apply it to parent-third party
disputes. 19 The best interests of the child doctrine, in contrast
to the parental right doctrine, focuses on the child's needs and
requires that the court consider the child's experience and emotional makeup when deciding to whom custody will be
17. See, e.g., Wilson v. Mitchell, 48 Colo. 454, 111 P. 21 (1910); Chapsky v.
Wood, 26 Kan. 650 (1881). See Eyre v. Countess of Shaftsbury, 2 P. Wins.
103, 24 Eng. Rep. 659 (1722); Sayre, Awarding Custody of Children, 9 U. Cm.
L. REV. 672-79 (1942).
18. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 602 (1980).
Best Interest of Child.
(a) The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interest of the child. The court shall consider all relevant factors
including:
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody;
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his
parent or parents, his siblings and any other person who may
significantly affect the child's best interest;
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school and community;
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved;
and
(6) the physical violence or threat of physical violence by the
child's potential custodian, whether directed against the
child or directed against another person but witnessed by the
child.
(b) The court shall not consider conduct of a present or proposed custodian that does not affect his relationship to the child.
For a criticism of the best interest standard as it is applied in Illinois
custody proceedings, see Taylor, Child Custody Problems in Illinois, 24 DE

PAUL L. REV. 521 (1975). See also Schiller, supra note 2 (discussion of the
need to enact legislation which provides objective criteria and frees the
court of evidentiary and procedural formalities); Comment, The Child Custody Provisionsof the IllinoisMarriageand Dissolutionof MarriageAct, 56
Cm. KENT L. REV. 671 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Child Custody
Provisions].

19. Courts in Colorado, Illinois, Iowa, and Michigan appear to have
adopted the best interests of the child standard without reservations. See
McGough & Shindell, supra note 3, at 214. (A survey of jurisdictions lead
authors to conclude that the majority of jurisdictions either apply the parental rights doctrine or remain undecided as to which standard applies in
parent-third custody disputes). See also New Directions,supra note 10, at

548 (The comment takes three approaches and divides jurisdictions accordingly: Parental Rights, Intermediate, Child Focused); Note, Alternatives to
"ParentalRights" in Child Custody Disputes Involving Third Parties, 73

Yale LJ. 153 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Alternatives].
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awarded. 20
While Illinois is a jurisdiction which focuses on the child's
best interests, this does not necessarily mean that the state has
adopted, in total, the more extreme principles advocated by Beyond the Best Interests of the Child.2 1 This highly successful

joint work by three legal and psychiatric authorities advocates a
model child placement statute. This model urges courts to disregard parental rights if the bond between the child and such
parent has been broken. The parent's rights may also be overlooked if they interfere with a child's psychological relationship
that may have developed with a nonparent. The least detrimental alternative approach is the formula advocated to resolve
these custody disputes. This standard considers three factors in
making placement decisions: (1) safeguarding the child's need
for continuity of relationships; 22 (2) reflecting the child's sense
of time; 23 and (3) the law's incapacity to supervise interpersonal relationships and2 4its limited knowledge make long-range
predictions unrealistic.
Although still controversial, this approach is beginning to
have some impact in Illinois, but not to the extent that Illinois
courts consistently favor the "psychological parent" 25 over the
20. See note 18 supra.
21. See generally GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973) [hereinafter cited as GOLDSTEIN].
22. Id. at 35. The first guideline suggests that the law should protect and
foster "psychological parent-wanted relationships," as these continuous
and permanent relationships, surroundings, and environmental influences
are necessary for normal child development. The courts that follow this
guideline would regard child placement "as final and unconditional ...as
permanent as the placement of a newborn with its biological parents." Id.
23. Id. at 40. The second guideline, while a necessary part of the continuity concept requires consideration separate and apart from it. The authors suggest that the younger the child the easier it is to sever emotional
ties with an absent parent and to begin developing new ones with a potential psychological parent. They urge, therefore, that courts act quickly to
either restore an established relationship or replace it. All those concerned
with child placement must reduce the decision making time which must not
"exceed the time the child-to-be-placed can endure loss and uncertainty."
Id.
24. Id. at 49. This third guideline rejects the traditional notion that the
law has a "magical power ...to do what is far beyond its means." The law
can neither supervise the parent-child relationship on a day to day basis

nor can it cause one to develop and grow. Further, the law is incapable of
making long range predictions. The authors maintain that the law should
and usually does prefer "the private intrusions in them." They urge courts

to confine themselves to short range predictions in the child's best interest.
Id.

25. The term "psychological parent" is used in GOLDSTEIN, supra note
21, at 17. The authors describe the concept as follows:
[F] or the child, the physical realities of his conception and birth are not

the direct cause of his emotional attachment. This attachment results
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natural parent. Illinois courts have, however, given priority to
the needs of children rather than parents for some time. 26 The
courts have been supportive of their need for permanence and
stability that comes from a continuous relationship, 27 and have
avoided the pitfalls of long range prediction by opting for the
more modest short term prediction. 28 Yet, these same courts
have persistently side-stepped the contradiction between the
more traditional parental rights doctrine and the more contemporary best interests doctrine or child focused approach in parent-nonparent custody disputes. Unless a parent's fitness is
questioned or there are compelling reasons to conclude otherwise, there is a legal presumption that a child's interest is best
served in the custody of a natural parent. 29 This presumption
from day-to-day attention to his needs for physical care, nourishment,
comfort, affection, and stimulation. Only a parent who provides for
these needs will build a psychological relationship to the child on the
basis of the biological one and will become his "psychological parent"
in whose care the child can feel valued and "wanted."
The [psychological parent] role can be fulfilled either by a biological
parent or by an adoptive parent or by any other caring adult-but never
by an absent, inactive adult, whatever his biological or legal relationship to the child may be.
Id. at 19.
26. In 1969, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a natural parent may
be deprived of custody, without a finding of unfitness or forfeiture, if the
2d 201, 247
child's best interests require it. Edwards v. Livingston, 42 Ill.
N.E.2d 417 (1968). See Veverka, The Right of NaturalParentsto Their Children as Against Strangers: Is the Right Absolute? 61 ILL. B.J. 234 (1973)

[hereinafter cited as Veverkal for a history of Illinois law specifically dealing with custody fights between natural parents of legitimate children and
anyone other than the State.
App. 3d 454, 315 N.E.2d 623 (1974). The father
27. Look v. Look, 21 Ill.
agreed to the custodial arrangement with the grandparents for five years.
The court held:
When the people having the actual custody of the child at the time a
change is sought have properly provided and supervised its needs for a
substantial period of time and the child has become attached to the environment and to them... a court is not justified in transferring that
custody to another except for the most cogent reasons.
Id. at 456, 315 N.E.2d at 425-26. The father, by leaving his child with a third
party grandparent, lost the benefit of the presumption that he should have
custody.
App. 3d 157, 329 N.E.2d 333 (1975) Natural parents
28. In re Ross, 29 Ill.
sought the return of their twelve and fourteen year old daughters who had
been living with a foster family for more than six years. The appellate court
agreed that the guardian ad litem's depiction of the foster parents as the
psychological parents "reflects the relationship which has arisen" and
demonstrated interest in the children's immediate (short-range) best interests by not returning them to their natural parents. See note 24 supra.
29. Annot., 25 A.L.R. 3d 7, 20 (1969).
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allows courts to avoid the contest over which doctrine, in effect,
30
is controlling.
In In re Custody of Christy Elizabeth Townsend, 31 the court
has again been confronted with this conflict. This note will address the strength of the rule that a parent has a superior right
to the custody of his child, absent a finding of unfitness, and examine the strength of the presumption that it is in the child's
best interest to be in the custody of a natural parent. In addition
this note will further explore the circumstances necessary in Illinois to rebut that presumption in light of the unique set of circumstances that exist in this case. Of major concern is whether
the court has reconciled this rule and presumption with the statutorily mandated best interests standard which Illinois courts
have long professed to follow. Finally, this note will discuss the
basis for the wide discretion vested in the trial court, and analyze whether the appellate court reversal in this case squares
with Illinois case law.
FACTS AND FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT

In 1975, Gary Townsend, husband and father, began an intimate relationship with Dorothy Salmon. At the time Dorothy
was married to George Poling, and mother of a teenage daughter, Brenda. In 1976, Gary learned that Dorothy had become
pregnant by him. 32 Although a subsequent divorce attempt was
unsuccessful, he moved in with Dorothy, who was separated and
was soon to be divorced from her husband. After a few months,
Gary returned to his wife, but continued visiting Dorothy 33 up to
the time of the birth of their child. After Christy's birth, Gary
continued to visit Dorothy and Christy but by 1978, the relationship had begun to deteriorate.
On December 11, 1978, Dorothy went to the Townsend home
and shot and killed Gary's wife. She was subsequently convicted of the murder.3 From the day of the murder until the
30. See Alternatives, supra note 19, at 154-55 n.18. The author concludes
that most courts applying the best interest standard to third party contests
use a variety of procedural devices which invariably increase the likelihood
of the natural parent winning. The most common device employed is the
presumption that awarding custody to the biological parent will be in the
best interest of the child.
31. 90 IlM.App. 3d 292, 413 N.E.2d 428 (1980).
32. All parties stipulated that Gary is the father of Christy. See Brief for
Appellant at 5, In re Custody of Christy Elizabeth Townsend, 90 IlM. App. 3d
292, 413 N.E.2d 428 (1980).
33. Throughout this time, Gary's wife was aware of Gary's visits with
Dorothy. In re Custody of Christy Elizabeth Townsend, 90 m. App. 3d 292,
293, 413 N.E.2d 428, 429 (1980).
34. Id. at 294, 413 N.E.2d at 429. Dorothy was sentenced to thirty years,
and incarcerated at Dwight Correctional Center.
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date of Dorothy's trial, Christy was in the custody of her halfsister, Brenda Poling. Brenda, along with her own baby daughter, Courtney, had lived with Dorothy prior to the murder.
Shortly thereafter, the three moved
into the mobile home owned
35
and occupied by Brenda's father.
Gary's attempt to acquire custody of his daughter began after the murder, although he was unaware of her whereabouts at
that time. 36 Immediately after Dorothy's conviction, however,
37
Gary filed a petition to obtain custody. Brenda intervened.
At trial, Gary presented character witnesses who testified to
his good character and his good relationship with his son, Alan.
Gary also testified concerning his rapport with Christy 38 and his
plans for the future. 39 Brenda's witnesses similarly attested to
her good character and the warm relationship she and her
daughter shared with Christy. 40 Even prior to the murder
35. Id. Brenda testified that George, a father figure to the two children,
had a good relationship with them. Brenda, Christy and Courtney slept in
one bed in the smaller bedroom of the mobile home.
36. Id. The day after the murder, Gary tried to locate his daughter.
Brief for Appellant at 5, In re Custody of Christy Elizabeth Townsend, 90 Ill.
App. 3d 292, 413 N.E.2d 428 (1980). He was informed by the Macon County
State's Attorney's office that the child was being cared for.
37. Pursuant to ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 601(b) (1) (1979), the proceeding
commenced by the filing of a Petition for custody. Brenda Poling, pursuant
to a Leave to Intervene, filed a Counter-Petition for custody of her half-sister, Christy.
38. Gary testified that in the first six months or year of Christy's life he
visited Dorothy and Christy several times a week and consequently,
Christy came to know him as her father. In re Custody of Christy Elizabeth
Townsend. 90 Ill. App. 3d 292, 294, 413 N.E.2d 428, 429 (1980). See Brief for
Appellant at 5, In re Custody of Christy Elizabeth Townsend, 90 111. App. 3d
292, 413 N.E.2d 428 (1980). Gary allegedly exhibited affection for Christy
during the year and a half after her birth by doing such things as changing
her diaper, playing with her and putting her to bed. He allegedly bought
her gifts and clothing and spent time crafting a table and chairs for her to
play with. He allegedly maintained medical insurance for her and contributed to her support. But see Brief for Appellee at 5. In re Custody of
Christy Elizabeth Townsend, 90 111. App. 3d 929, 413 N.E.2d 428 (1980). Dorothy Salmon alleged that Gary did not exhibit much interest in Christy and
had requested that Brenda take Christy and leave when he came to visit
Dorothy. Dorothy also denied that Gary Townsend ever contributed any
money to Christy's support. Any money donated was for the phone calls
that Gary made and charged to Dorothy's phone.
39. In re Custody of Christy Elizabeth Townsend, 90 111. App. 3d 292, 294,
413 N.E.2d 428, 429 (1980). Gary testified concerning the large house that he
was building on several acres of land. Brief for Appellant at 6, In re Custody of Christy Elizabeth Townsend, 90 11M.
App. 3d 292, 413 N.E.2d 428
(1980). Christy would allegedly have her own bedroom, and farm animals
would be nearby.
40. See Attorney for Minor's Brief at 4, 5, In re Custody of Christy Elizabeth Townsend, 90 IM.App. 3d 292, 413 N.E.2d 428 (1980). Christy and
Courtney are the same age and have been raised as sisters. Evidence indicates that because of the close relationship Christy and Courtney share, the
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Brenda took an active role in raising and caring for Christy, as
Dorothy went back to work soon after her birth.
Dr. Kiley, a child psychologist who had on several occasions
observed Brenda and the children together, testified that they
shared a warm relationship. In particular, he was pleased that
Brenda was taking Christy to visit her mother as he believed
these visits would permit a relationship between mother and
daughter that could eventually help Christy better cope with,
and understand the tragic events and circumstances of her
life. 4 1
In his closing argument, Christy's guardian ad litem42 recommended that she be placed permanently with Brenda. While
finding both parties fit and suitable custodians, the trial judge
noted that Christy had never been in her father's home as his
daughter, implying an absence of any familial bond between
them. Further, the court considered the effect that Christy's living with her father would have on Gary's son. Accordingly, the
judge decided that it was in Christy's best interests to remain in
the custody of Brenda. Gary was, however, granted visitation
rights.

43

OPINION OF THE ILLINOIS APPELLATE COURT

The Illinois Appellate Court reversed the trial court's grant
of custody to Brenda Poling and remanded with the direction
that custody be granted to Gary Townsend. The court determined that inadequate consideration was given to Gary Townsend's right as the child's father.44
The court, in measuring the strength of the natural parent's
right to the custody of his or her child against the best interest
standard, found that it was very strong indeed. The court stated
that although the nonparent may be given custody without a
separation of the two would be "traumatic". It has also become apparent
that Christy views her half-sister as a psychological parent. Id.
41. Attorney for Minor's Brief at 6, In re Custody of Christy Elizabeth
Townsend, 90 Ill.
App. 3d 292, 413 N.E.2d 428 (1980). Dr. Kiley testified that
due to the rancor between the parents, if Christy was in the custody of Gary
Townsend, "future visitation with the mother might do more harm than
good." Id.
42. See Schiller, supra note 2, at 253 for an explanation of the guardian
ad litem's function in child custody disputes. See also IL.mRE v. STAT. ch. 40,
§ 506 (1977), which provides for representation of the child at the discretion
of the court.
App. 3d 292, 295,
43. In re Custody of Christy Elizabeth Townsend, 90 Ill.
413 N.E.2d 428, 429 (1980). The trial judge described the case as the most
difficult he had been involved in during his nine year tenure on the bench.
44. See STORY, supra note 15, dealing with the father's right to the custody of his child at common law. See also text accompanying note 15 supra.
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finding of parental unfitness or forfeiture of parental rights,
there is a presumption that it is in a child's best interest to be in
the custody of a natural parent. Therefore, the courts require
some "compelling reasons, '45 "convincing grounds," 46 or "other
circumstances," 47 sufficient to overcome a parent's right to
custody.
The court determined that there were no compelling reasons, and therefore no justification, for the decision to place
Christy with her half-sister. The court rejected, as not compelling, the trial court's concern that granting custody to Gary
Townsend could adversely affect his son.48 The court similarly
rejected the trial court's decision that Christy's need to maintain
contact with her mother was not a compelling reason to give
49
Brenda custody.
Finally, while cognizant that the close, long-term relationship that had developed between Brenda, Christy, and Courtney
was an important factor, the court considered Christy's attachment to her environment as of the time her father first sought
custody. Christy was then 21/% years old. To do otherwise, the
court reasoned, "would encourage a litigant with custody to de45. 90 Ill.
App. 3d at 296, 413 N.E.2d at 431, citing Pierson v. Bloodworth,
81 Ill.
App. 3d 645, 652, 401 N.E.2d 1320, 1325 (1980); See note 76 infra.
46. Id., citing Soldner v. Soldner, 69 Ill.
App. 3d 97, 102, 386 N.E.2d 1153,
1157 (1979); See note 76 infra.

47. Id., citing Sholty v.Sholty, 67 Ill.
App. 2d 60, 64-65, 214 N.E.2d 15, 17
(1966); See note 76 infra.
48. We are not unmindful, of course, that placing custody with Gary
Townsend would require that Alan live in the same home with a girl
whose mother had killed Alan's own mother. However, there was considerable testimony at trial concerning Alan's successful adjustment to
the fact that his mother had been killed, and we find nothing in the
evidence suggesting that he would be upset by Christy's presence.
Thus, Alan's situation is not a compelling reason for placing custody
with Brenda.
Id. at 297, 413 N.E.2d at 431. But see Petition for Leave to Appeal at 8, In re
Custody of Christy Elizabeth Townsend, 90 IMI.App. 3d 292, 413 N.E.2d 428
(1980). The attorney for Brenda Poling commented that at the time of the
trial Alan Townsend had only met Christy once and therefore no relationship existed between them. Interpreting the trial court's and Christy's attorney's observations of the situation, Christy would be a living reminder
that his mother was murdered by her mother.
49. The court suggested that visits with Dorothy need not be precluded,
since George Poling and Dorothy had apparently remarried, and if George
and Brenda's affection for Christy is as strong as it then appeared to be,
they will be able to arrange for Christy to visit with her mother on a regular
basis. In addition, the court said that Gary promised to cooperate in any
court order requiring him to allow these visits. Thus, the court was satisfied
that contact between Dorothy and Christy could be adequately maintained
if Gary was awarded custody. 90 Ill.
App. 3d at 297, 413 N.E.2d at 431. But
see note 41 supra regarding the potentially negative effects such visits
would have on Christy if placed in the custody of her father.
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lay trial in order to build up long standing ties. ' 50 The court also
decided that a 2% year old child could not have grown so attached "to his environment and those around him that a change
in custody would necessarily be devastating."'5 1
Concluding that the decision to grant custody to Brenda was
against the manifest weight of the evidence, the court reversed,
stating that absent compelling reasons a father cannot be deprived of the custody of his child. The dissenting Justice, however, noted that the viability of Christy living with her father
and adjusting to the living arrangements under the circumstances was uncertain.5 2 Further, the trial court might have believed Dorothy Salmon's testimony that Townsend had not
provided child support, nor shown any interest in the child during his visits. The Justice also stated that the trial court's concern over how Christy might retain her relationship with her
mother while living with her father and half-brother was a valid
one. 53 Therefore, the Justice determined that there were compelling reasons for a trial court to hold that the child's best interests would be served by permitting her to remain in the custody
54
of her half-sister.
CONFLICTING DOCTRINES

The custody provisions of the Marriage and Dissolution of
Marriage Act, 55 adopted by Illinois in 1977, provide in part that
"the court shall determine custody in accordance with the best
interest of the child. '56 These provisions were adopted from the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act 57 and retain, in essence, the
same best interest standard that existed under the prior Illinois
58
Divorce Act.
50. 90 Ill. App. 3d at 298, 413 N.E.2d at 431. The record is devoid of any
indication that Brenda purposely sought delay in order to obtain an advantage, nor was she accused of any such motive.
51. Id.

52. The dissenting justice felt that even if Christy's situation is viewed
as it existed when the petition for custody was fied, the court could have
concluded from the testimony of Dr. Kiley and Brenda Poling that "Christy
had been well cared for and was happy in Brenda's custody." This arrangement had proved to be a viable one. (Green, J., dissenting). 90 Ill. App. 3d
292, 298, 413 N.E.2d 428, 432 (1980).

53. See note 55 and accompanying text supra.

54. The Supreme Court of Illinois heard the case on appeal late this
spring and an opinion was rendered in September, 1981. See EPILOGUE in
the accompanying text infra.
55. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, §§ 601-610 (1977).

56. Id. § 602. See note 18 supra.

57. 9 A UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED §§ 401-410.
58. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 19 (1975) "[T]he court ...shall make such
order touching the care, custody, support and education of the minor chil-
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The Townsend Court acknowledged this "best interests"
custody provision and immediately distinguished it from the
Adoption Act. Unlike the latter Act, the custody provision does
not allude to the requirement of finding the parent to be unfit
59
before custody may be placed with someone else.

The issue of whether a natural parent must be proved unfit
is one with which Illinois courts have long struggled. The court
acknowledged that the issue was finally decided in the 1969 decision of People ex rel. Edwards v. Livingston.60 In Livingston,
the Illinois Supreme Court held that parental custody should6be
1
denied where consistent with the best interests of the child.
This child focused standard 62 was no stranger to Illinois
courts in the years prior to its inclusion in the Marriage and Dissolution Act. 63 While confirming this, the court, in juxtaposition
to the multitude of cases stating this standard, also correctly
cited the long standing rule that the natural parent has the superior right to the custody of his or her child. 64 In light of these
potentially conflicting rules, the Townsend court incorrectly concluded that the trial court had failed to give adequate consideration to the rights of the father in making the custody
65
determination.
dren of the parties or any of them, as shall be deemed proper for the benefit
of the children."
59. See note 36 supra. See generally In re Massey, 35 111.App. 3d 518, 341
App. 3d 393, 340 N.E.2d 150 (1975).
N.E.2d 405 (1976); In re Ladewig, 34 Ill.

2d 204, 247 N.E.2d 417 (1969).
60. 42 Ill.
2d 201, 209, 247 N.E.2d 417, 421 (1969). In Livingston, the Illi61. 42 Ill.

nois Supreme Court said:

The best interest of the child is the standard and it is not necessary that
the natural parent be found unfit or be found to have legally forfeited
his rights to custody, if it is in the best interest of the child that he be

placed in the custody of someone other than the natural parent.
See Veverka, supra note 26.
62. See generally notes 18-21 and accompanying text supra.
63. See, e.g., Nye v. Nye, 411 1.408, 105 N.E.2d 300, 304 (1952) ('The guiding star is and must be, at all times the best interest of the child.");
2d 556, 565, 158 N.E.2d 613, 618
Giacopelli v. Florence Crittenton Home, 16 Ill.

(1959) ('The parents' natural rights must give way to the welfare and best
interest of the child.").

519, 523, 71 N.E. 1077, 1079
64. See, e.g., Cormack v. Marshall, 211 Ill.

(1904) ("We regard the rights of the parent as superior ...when that parent is a fit person to have the custody ... and is so circumstanced that he

can provide the requirements of such a charge."); Jarrett v. Jarrett, 348 Ill.
App. 1, 6, 107 N.E.2d 622, 625 (1952) ("[T]he right of a parent to the custody
of his child is superior to that of any other person when he is fit and can
provide the necessities of life and where both contestants are equally
proper persons.").
App. 3d at 295,
65. In re Custody of Christy Elizabeth Townsend, 90 Ill.
413 N.E.2d at 429 (1980).
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The appellate court gleaned from other parent-third party
custody cases that a nonparent can be given custody without a
finding of parental unfitness, yet there remains the presumption
that it is in the child's best interest to be in the custody of a
natural parent. 66 Consequently, the courts require some "special circumstances" 67 before awarding the child to a nonparent,
third party.
The appellate court's reliance on the strength of the rule
and the presumption was misplaced. Although Illinois appellate
courts are divided with regard to a mother's superior right, as
against a father's to the custody of a very young child, 68 there is
agreement with regard to a natural parent's superior right to the
custody of his or her minor child, as against claims made by
nonparents. The appellate courts, however, have also agreed
that the rights of natural parents are subordinate to the primary
concern with advancing the best interests and welfare of the
child. 69
The court, in its opinion, implied that this presumption is
applicable in all instances in custody proceedings, and it is applied only with the provision that it be in accord with the child's
best interest. Its most common application is in a marriage dis70
solution action when a third party intervenes in the action. It
is not unusual, however, to see it applied in a custody action

brought by a natural parent who has maintained a continuing
66. In re Marriage of Braden, 70 IMI.
App. 3d 535, 536, 388 N.E.2d 939, 940
(1979); Eaton v. Eaton, 50 M1.App. 3d 306, 310, 365 N.E.2d 647, 650 (1977) (it is
in the child's best interest to be raised by his natural parent absent a clear
showing to the contrary).
67. See notes 79-82 and accompanying text infra.
68. A presumption historically used by courts in Illinois is the "tender
years doctrine," which presumes that it is in the best interest of children of
tender years that they be placed in the custody of their mothers. Nye v.
Nye, 411 Ill.
408, 105 N.E.2d 300, 303 (1952). This Illinois Supreme Court decision has not been overruled.
Some appellate courts in Illinois have rejected the tender years presumption as contrary to the Illinois Constitution which provides that equal
protection of the law shall not be denied or abridged because of sex. See
. CONST. art. 1, § 18. See, e.g., Anagnostopoulos v. Anagnostopoulos, 22 IIl.
App. 3d 479, 482, 317 N.E.2d 681, 683 (1974); Jines v. Jines, 63 Inl. App. 3d 564,
380 N.E.2d 440, 443 (1978). See generally Annot., 70 A.L.R. 3d 262 (1976).
Other appellate courts continue to advocate and use this presumption.
69. Historical and Practice Notes, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 602 (SmithHurd, 1980).
70. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Braden, 70 Ill. App. 3d 535, 388 N.E.2d 939
(1979). The trial court awarded custody of the infant to grandparents with
whom she had never lived, rather than to the mother with whom she had
been living. The decision was based on the mother's alleged immaturity.
The appellate court reversed and reunited mother and infant on the basis
that it was in the child's best interest to live with her mother whose care
and nurture of the infant was not found to be lacking or inferior.
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relationship with the child following the death of the custodial
parent. Usually, in this instance, the third party 71 has assumed
custody subsequent to the death, and the court has adjudged
both parties to be equally fit.7 2 Common to both is a past or
present familial bond between parent and child.
Illinois has not applied this presumption to a putative father
seeking custody of his child where the custodial parent was still
living, although incarcerated. Biology, rather than a past or
present familial relationship, is the sole basis for Gary Townsend's assertion of parental rights.
In Townsend the court cites Livingston 73 and Pierson v.
Bloodworth74 as examples of the magic language of "compelling
'7 5
reasons," "convincing grounds," or "other circumstances,
without which a nonparent cannot win a custody dispute. However, the court neither distinguished nor analogized these cases.
If it had, the court would have discovered that while requiring
special circumstances, the cases turned on, and were concerned
with, the best interest and welfare of the child,7 6 and "that the
71. See generally Soldner v. Soldner, 69 Ill. App. 3d 97, 386 N.E.2d 1153
(1979); Eaton v. Eaton, 50 IlM. App. 3d 306, 365 N.E.2d 647 (1977); Sholty v.

Sholty, 67 Ml1. App. 2d 60, 214 N.E.2d 15 (1966). Usually the third party is a
step-parent, grandparent, or close relative.
72. Barclay v. Barclay, 66 Ill. App. 3d 1028, 1031, 384 N.E.2d 564, 567
(1978). In a dispute between parents and grandparents where both parties
are found equally fit to care for the child, the parents generally prevail. The
rule, however, is applicable only when the parents are not chargeable with
laches or forfeiture, but the rule always yields to the best interest of child.
73. People ex rel. Edwards v. Livingston, 42 Ill. 2d 201, 247 N.E.2d 417
(1969). See note 28 supra.
74. 81 Ill. App. 3d 645, 401 N.E.2d 1320 (1980).
75. See notes 45-47 supra.
76. Pierson v. Bloodworth, 81 111.App. 3d 645, 401 N.E.2d 1320 (1980).
Custody was awarded to the nonparent/aunt. Facts were cited which
clearly indicated that it was in the children's best interest to be in the custody of the aunt/stepmother. The children had lived with their natural father and stepmother for ten years. After the father's death, their natural
mother who visited monthly, asserted her superior rights to custody. The
compelling reasons justifying an award of custody to the aunt/stepmother
were: 1) the children expressly preferred remaining with their stepmother;
2) violent quarrels between the natural mother and her husband which upset the children; 3) one child's academic performance was adversely effected while living with her natural mother; 4) the children would suffer a
negative impact from the severance of social ties developed over the ten
year period.
In Soldner v. Soldner, 69 Ill. App. 3d 97, 386 N.E.2d 1153 (1979), the appellate court reversed the trial court. It held that evidence which confirmed
that the divorced mother entrusted the care of her child to the paternal
grandparents, often during the week but for good reasons, did not indicate
that the welfare and best interests of the child, who was born handicapped
and subject to seizures and frequent illness, would not be served by continued custody of the child. While the court stressed that convincing grounds
must be proved demonstrating that the natural parent should not have custody, it stated that the superior right of the parent will prevail when other-
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superior right of the natural parent to custody of the child can
'77
only be determined in context of the best interest of the child.
In Livingston, a father was denied custody of his son whom
he had not seen for eleven years, although he lived within thirty
miles of the child's home. 78 This constituted more than convincing grounds, and could clearly have been regarded as abandon79
ment of all parental duties or forfeiture of all parental rights.
In Pierson, the court cited facts which also indicated that it was
in the children's best interest to be in the custody of their aunt.
Poor scholastic achievement while living with the mother as
well as the children's desire to remain with their aunt were
deemed compelling reasons by the court. 80
In Townsend, the appellate court failed to consider a recent
8l
case which is factually analogous. In Mitchell v. Henderson,
the plaintiff who failed to prove paternity was denied custody of
his alleged illegitimate child whose mother had died. The court
held that a superior parental right exists only when it is consistent with the best interest of the child. It reasoned that it would
not be in the child's best interest to separate her from her grandmother, aunt, and half-sister who had been providing her with
good care, attention and a stable environment so that she may
live with her "alleged" father and his family even if the issue of
paternity were decided otherwise.8 2 Certainly, the special circumstances in Mitchell are similar to the circumstances in the
instant case.
These cases emphasize that the presumption of superior parental rights is merely a factor 8 3 to be considered under the
wise consistent with the child's best interest. A strong dissent was made in
favor of the broad discretion that is accorded the trial judge in custody
cases.
In Sholty v. Sholty, 67 Ill. App. 2d 60, 214 N.E.2d 15 (1966), the court held
that the evidence supported the decision to award custody to the father
rather than the maternal grandparents with whom the mother and child
lived before the wife died. "Superior parental rights may be limited by the
parents' conduct or other circumstances." Evidence in this case indicated
that the father's conduct "had not been inconsistent with his duties and
responsibilities as a parent." Id.
77. Id. at 64, 214 N.E.2d at 17.
78. People ex rel. Edwards v. Livingston, 42 Ill. 2d 201, 203, 247 N.E.2d
417, 419 (1969).
79. Id. at 205, 247 N.E.2d at 422.
80. See note 76 supra.
81. 65 Ill. App. 3d 363, 382 N.E.2d 650 (1978).
82. Id. at 367, 382 N.E.2d at 654. The child barely knows plaintiff, and she
has never been led to believe that he is her father. Further, proper care and
attention in the plaintiff's home is questionable.
83. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 602 (1980).
Subsection (a) states that the court shall consider all relevant factors
and specifically lists six non-exclusive factors. The first five of these factors
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Marriage and Dissolution Act. Townsend erroneously views parental rights as the factor and places it on an equal footing with
the best interests standard. Instead, it must be regarded as only
one of several elements in the child's social and emotional environment to be considered in determining what is in the child's
best interest. Special circumstances and convincing reasons
that compel or justify awarding custody to one party over another party, be they parent-parent disputes or parent-third party
disputes can always be found.
The Townsend court, applying such nebulous and seemingly
subjective terms as "convincing grounds" and "best interest" to
the evidence, concluded that each of the factors that the trial
court considered in making its judgment was insufficient to surmount its view of what constitutes a "compelling reason. '8 4 The
court, with its narrow vision, neglected to consider all the fac86
tors,85 which taken together as they should be in every case,

and as they were in Pierson, contribute to a court's final
disposition.
Section (a) of the Marriage and Dissolution Act provides
that the court shall consider all relevant factors in determining
child custody, including several enumerated factors. 87 It does
not require the court to make specific findings of fact as to those
derive from § 402 of the Uniform Act. See note 57 supra. See generally note
18 supra. "[T] he language of the section makes it clear that the judge need
not be limited to the factors specified." Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act
(9A U.L.A.) § 402, Commissioner's note at 198. Presumptions which developed under prior law for determining the best interests of the child are left
to case law development insofar as they will continue to be considered "relevant factors" under this subsection. The Commissioner's Note to § 402 of
the Uniform Act states: "Although none of the familiar presumptions developed by the case law are mentioned here, the language of the section is
consistent with preserving such rules of thumb." Id.
84. In re Custody of Christy Elizabeth Townsend, 90 M1.App. 3d 292, 297,
413 N.E.2d 428, 432 (1980).
85. The court neglected to take into account the conflicting testimony
regarding Gary Townsend's support payments and his past interest and
concern for his child. The fact that Christy had never lived with her father
was a justified concern mentioned in the dissent but ignored in the majority
oinion. The court similarly failed to take into account the recommendation of the guardian ad litem as well as the recommendation of the child
psychologist.
86. See, e.g., In In re Custody of Angela Marie Piccirilli, 88 Ill. App. 3d
621, 410 N.E.2d 1086 (1980). The appellate court held that there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to sustain its finding that it would be in the
best interests of the child to remain in the custody of her paternal grandparents and that there was no abuse of discretion in making that decision. The
trial court did not merely take into account the facts that the child lived
almost all her life with her grandparents and desired to remain with them
in making a custody determination; rather, "all the facts were considered in
determining the best interests of the child." Id. at 621, 410 N.E.2d at 1091.
87. See note 18 supra.
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factors. It does require, however, that the record contain sufficient evidence concerning them to enable the trial court to make
a reasoned decision regarding custody. 88 The Townsend record
was sufficient to allow the majority to reject those factors

piecemeal. 89
TRIAL COURT DISCRETION V. APPELLATE COURT REVIEW

While no two custody cases are alike, generally they all
share two common elements. 90 One is that the 'best interest' of
the child will control the decision. The other is that great discretion 91 is vested in the trial court, and great credence9 2 afforded
its findings and determinations. Neither is apparently present
in this case. The general rule requires that a court of review not
disturb the findings of the trial court unless it clearly abused its
discretion, 93 the findings are palpably erroneous or manifestly
against the weight of the evidence, 94 or unless it appears that a
95
manifest injustice has been done.
The trial judge is in a unique position to observe the parties'
conduct and presence while testifying, and is thereby better
able to discern what is in the child's best interest.96 The presumption favoring the trial court's determination is compelling
88. See Atkinson v. Atkinson, 82 Ill. App. 3d 617, 402 N.E.2d 831, 835
(1980) (record contained sufficient evidence concerning the specified factors); Blonsky v. Blonsky, 84 Il. App. 3d 810, 817, 405 N.E.2d 1112, 1119 (1980)
(trial court did not err in failing to articulate one of the findings). See also
Melear v. Melear, 76 Ill. App. 3d 706, 395 N.E.2d 208 (1979) distinguishing
Wurm v. Wurm, 68 Ill. App. 3d 168, 385 N.E.2d 894 (1979) ("We do not read
either Wurm or the new Marriage Act as mandating a recital of the specified
factors in the judgment order or as requiring written findings of fact in any
other form... [just] some indication in the record that the trial court considered the factors listed."). See Child Custody Provisions,supra note 18,
at 677-79.
89. While lacking the detailed findings found in Pierson and Piccirilli,
the findings were sufficient for both the majority and the dissent to comment on them accordingly.
90. Soldner v. Soldner, 69 Il. App. 3d 97, 104, 386 N.E.2d 1153, 1159 (1979).
91. See Eaton v. Eaton, 50 Ill. App. 3d 306, 310, 365 N.E.2d 647, 651 (1977);
In re Stilley, 66 Il1. 2d 515, 520, 363 N.E.2d 820, 822 (1977).
92. See Soldner v. Soldner, 69 Ill. App. 3d 97, 105, 386 N.E.2d 1153, 1159
(1979) (dissent quotes the most often cited versions of the rule in Giacopelli
v. Florence Crittenton Home, 16 IlM. 2d 556, 158 N.E.2d 613 (1959)).
App. 3d 66, 72, 74, 379 N.E.2d 713, 719
93. Cebrzynski v. Cebrzynski, 63 M11.
(1978).
94. Garrison v. Garrison, 75 IM. App. 3d 726, 729, 394 N.E.2d 788, 791
(1979).
App. 3d 617, 625, 402 N.E.2d 831, 836
95. Atkinson v. Atkinson, 82 M11.
(1980).
96. See note 90 supra. Look v. Look, 21 ]MI. App. 3d 454, 458, 315 N.E.2d
623, 626 (1974) citing Giacopelli v. Florence Crittenton Home, 16 m. 2d 556,
158 N.E.2d 613 (1959).
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in custody cases because of these factors.9 7 Further, conflicting
evidence does not-justify disturbing the court's conclusion. 98
It is clear from the record that the trial court agonized over
its determination. 99 Although the appellate court finds that inadequate consideration was given to Gary Townsend's rights as
the natural father, 100 there is evidence to the contrary in the record. The trial judge made several references to parental rights
and gave what he thought to be compelling reasons why
Christy's interests would be better served with her half-sister
than with her father. 0 1
While recognizing that the presumption favoring the natural
parent must not be disturbed, the appellate court ignored the
presumption which prefers the existing custodian over any new
custodian because of the interest in assuring continuity for the
child.10 2 The court dismissed this issue by refusing to examine
Christy's attachment to her surroundings from a point subsequent to the filing of the initial custody petition. 0 3 The court
failed to consider realistically that the child was now 4 years old,
97. See Atkinson v. Atkinson, 82 Il. App. 3d 617, 625, 402 N.E.2d 831, 836
(1980); Gren v. Gren, 59 Ill. App. 3d 624, 625, 375 N.E.2d 999, 1000 (1978).
98. Vysoky v. Vysoky, 85 Ill. App. 2d 306, 230 N.E.2d 3 (1967); Kokotekian
v. Kokotekian, 23 Ill. App. 2d 171, 161 N.E.2d 712 (1959).
99. See Record, In re Custody of Christy Elizabeth Townsend, No. 79-F149 (Cir. Ct. Macon County 1980). See also Oster, Custody Proceeding: A
Study of Vague and Indefinite Standards, 5 J. FAm. L. 21 (1965) speaking for
the court, Judge Botein said "a judge agonizes more about reaching the
right result in a contested custody issue than about any other type of decision." Id. at 23.
100. In re Custody of Christy Elizabeth Townsend, 90 Ill. App. 3d 292, 295,
413 N.E.2d 428, 431 (1980).
101. See Record, In re Custody of Christy Elizabeth Townsend, No. 79-F149 (Cir. Ct. Macon County 1980).
102. See generally Commissioners' Note, UNiFoRM MARRIAGE AND DiVORCE ACT § 402. See note 27 supra;text accompanying notes 81-82 supra;
Annot. 25 A.L.R. 3d 7 (1969); Barclay v. Barclay, 66 Ill. App. 3d 1028, 1032, 384
N.E.2d 564, 567 (1978) (natural parent did not have superior right to custody
where paternal grandparents originally took child temporarily but with
time they became psychological parents, and the child's best interest would
not be served by taking him from their home); People ex rel. Hermann v.
Jenkins, 34 Ill. App. 2d 255, 180 N.E.2d 359 (1962) ("In a particular case the
forces of environment may be so strong as to compel the court, in the best
interests of the child, to deny the natural right of the father even when he is
a perfectly fit person to have custody of the child); Look v. Look, 21 Ill. App.
3d 454, 457, 315 N.E.2d 623, 626 (1974) ("To sever home ties of long standing
as here where the child has lived with the grandparents almost all of his
life, a home full of love and care, for the sole purpose of placing him with his
father cannot be said to be in the best interest of the child."). See also
Mackie v. Mackie, 88 Ill. App. 2d 61, 69, 232 N.E.2d 184, 189 (1967); Price v.
Price, 329 Ill. App. 176, 67 N.E.2d 311 (1946).
In each case cited, the children's strong ties to their present environment was a major consideration in the court's determination in favor of the
nonparent and is analogous to the instant case.
103. See notes 50-51 and accompanying text supra.
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not 2', and that change at this time could be devastating.1 0 4
In addition, the court, unlike the court in Cebrzynski v.
Cebrzynski, chose to ignore the recommendation and proffered
testimony of the child psychologist.10 5 The Cebrzynski court
awarded custody to the stepmother, given psychiatric testimony
that the children's emotional health would be damaged if they
were returned to the natural mother. 0 6 Similarly, the appellate
court in Townsend chose to ignore, unlike the court in Garrison
v. Garrison,the fact that the father's version of his efforts at
parenthood, including his alleged payment of support was not as
persuasive as the mother's regarding these efforts. 10 7 The Garrison court awarded temporary custody to the grandmother,
choosing to accept evidence that ran counter to the father's account of his attempts at making contact with his daughter.l0 8
It is axiomatic that the contributing elements and circumstances involved in each case in which custody is at issue are sui
generis. 0 9 As a consequence, appellate courts give considera104. See GOLDsTEiN, supra note 21, at 31.
Change of the caretaking person for infants and toddlers further
affects the course of their emotional development. Their attachments,
at these ages, are as thoroughly upset by separations as they are effectively promoted by the constant, uninterrupted presence and attention
of a familiar adult. When infants and young children find themselves
abandoned by the parent, they not only suffer separation distress and
anxiety but also setbacks in the quality of their next attachments,
which will be less trustful. Where continuity of such relationships is
interrupted more than once, as happens due to multiple placements in
the early years, the children's emotional attachments become increasingly shallow and indiscriminate. They tend to grow up as persons who
lack warmth in their contacts with fellow beings.
For young children under the age of five years, every disruption of
the continuity also affects those achievements which are rooted and develop in the intimate interchange with a stable parent figure, who is in
the process of becoming the psychological parent. The more recently
the achievement has been acquired, the easier it is for the child to lose
it. Examples of this are cleanliness and speech. After separation from
the familiar mother, young children are known to have breakdowns in
toilet training and to lose or lessen their ability to communicate verbally.
Id. at 32-33.
105. See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
106. Cebrzynski v. Cebrzynski, 63 Ill. App. 3d 66, 379 N.E.2d 713 (1978).
107. See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
108. Garrison v. Garrison, 75 Ill. App. 3d 726, 394 N.E.2d 788 (1979).
109. Look v. Look, 21 Ill. App. 3d 454, 457, 315 N.E.2d 623, 625 (1974).
In proceedings affecting the custody of a child, the primary consideration is the present and prospective welfare of the child, or as otherwise
stated, the best interest of the child. Naturally, no hard and fast rule
can be laid down as what will best serve the welfare and interests of a
child. Each case must be determined according to its own circumstances and the question rests largely on the sound discretion of the
trial court.
Id.
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ble deference to the decisions of trial judges. By rejecting this
widely accepted rule, the appellate court's reversal in Townsend
signalled a contravention of the deference typically accorded
the trial court. It chose to substitute its judgment and analysis
of the facts for that of the trial judge, who had the best opportunity to evaluate the evidence and to observe the credibility and
behavior of the witnesses giving that evidence. Unless clearly
appellate court
against the manifest weight of the evidence, 1the
10
should not disturb the trial court's decision.
CONCLUSION

The issue of whether a "pure" best interest standard will
prevail in Illinois in a third party custody dispute requires a determination by the Illinois Supreme Court. Whether or not In re
Custody of Christy Elizabeth Townsend will become a landmark
case is questionable at best. The unique facts of this case may
be its main flaw. However, since lifestyles, morals, and family
life are in a constant state of flux, future cases may be even
more complex. If the best interest standard is good law, then it
should be applicable no matter how bizarre the case. If it does
not apply to any given set of facts then it is altogether useless,
and the legislature will be forced to be more precise, therefore,
leaving less open to judicial interpretation.
Most recent decisions, however, reflect the growing dominance of the child's interest and welfare. Thus, judges are more
cognizant of their particularly unique responsibility to the child
and express this concern by refusing to honor the biological relationship when the natural parents are less capable of providing for the child's psychological well-being than the third party.
Recent decisions also continue to echo past decisions regarding the deference given to the trial court's discretion. While
its discretion is broad, it is neither absolute nor uncontrollable.
It is not clear, however, when the trial court commits an abuse of
discretion, or when the findings are against the manifest weight
of the evidence, as specific findings of fact are not required.
What is a clear abuse is when an appellate court reweighs rather
than reviews the same facts taken into account by the trial judge
in making his decision.
In conclusion, consider again the story of the wisdom of Solomon. Inextricably linked to it is the ploy that "blood is thicker
than water." However, in view of our ever increasing sophistication and fascination with modern psychology, this philosophy is
110. See notes 93-95 and accompanying text supra.
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clearly out of synch and has become as much an anachronism"1
as is the decision rendered by the appellate court in In re Custody of Christy Elizabeth Townsend.
EPILOGUE-THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT

The Illinois Supreme Court in In re Custody of Christy Elizabeth Townsend reversed the judgements of both the appellate
and circuit courts and remanded to the circuit court of Macon
County for a hearing consistent with what was expressed in the
opinion." 2 While giving "single factor" status to both the presumption favoring the parent over the nonparent and the existing custodian over any new custodian to insure continuity in
the child's life," 3 the court applied the former as though it were
the only factor." 4 The court deemphasized Christy's strong ties
to Brenda and her environment while overemphasizing Gary's
superior parental rights at the expense of the statutorily mandated best interests standard.1 1 5 The court viewed the relationship between Brenda and Christy as beginning from a legal time
frame i.e. when Christy's natural parent filed the action, when,
in reality, it began at birth and has continued for more than five
years." 6 This preferential treatment, afforded the existing custodian, could not "neutralize" the presumption favoring the natural parent. The court did, however, acknowledge that it could
be a "determining factor" in a given case." 7 The court apparently focused on Gary's rights and feelings," 8 abandoning
Christy's psychological needs for another ride on the legal
merry-go-round. The court has thus avoided making a definitive
pronouncement and, at the same time, has left the lower court
with little or no direction. Perhaps, the court's most obvious
flaw is its conspicuous silence regarding the rationale behind
the decision to reverse the appellate court. In fact, the court
gave every impression, throughout, that the judgment of the appellate court would be affirmed. To add to the confusion, the
lower court was directed to consider the recent marriages of all
111. See McGough & Shindell, supra note 3, at 243.

112. In re Custody of Christy Elizabeth Townsend, Nos. 54282, 54365

cons., slip op. (Ill. Sup. Ct. Sept. 1981).

113. See notes 27, 28 & 102 and accompanying text supra.
114. In re Custody of Christy Elizabeth Townsend, Nos. 54282, 54365
cons., slip. op. at 4, 11 (l. Sup. Ct. Sept. 1981).
115. Id. at 11. Contra, notes 69 and 83 and accompanying text supra.
116. In re Custody of Christy Elizabeth Townsend, Nos. 54282, 54365
cons., slip op. at 11 (M1. Sup. Ct. Sept. 1981). Contra,notes 40, 50, 103 and 104
and accompanying text supra.
117. In re Custody of Christy Elizabeth Townsend, Nos. 54282, 54365
cons., slip op. at 11 (l. Sup. Ct. Sept. 1981).
118. Id. at 10-11. Contra, note 16 and accompanying text supra.
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the principals in this continuing family saga. 1 9 Had the court
deferred to the trial court decision as the analysis of this casenote indicates and had the court genuinely concerned itself with
Christy's best interest, her future would not now remain uncertain. At this "sometimes pace of our judicial process,"' 20 Christy
is likely to reach her majority before a final determination is
made.
Lynn A. Cohen

119. In re Custody of Christy Elizabeth Townsend, Nos. 54282, 54365
cons., slip op. at 12 (IM. Sup. Ct. Sept. 1981).
120. Id. at 11.

